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ARMY review(s)  
completed.

USAF review(s)  
completed.

OSD REVIEW  
COMPLETED

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied

PACOM  
review(s)  
completed.

DIA review(s)  
completed.

NAVY review(s)  
completed.

ARMY review(s)  
completed.

SECRET

25X1

25 Jan 67

MEMORANDUM NO:

248

MEMORANDUM FOR:

25X1

SUBJECT:

Agency Evaluation of MACV Report in the Role of  
Cambodia in the NVA-VC War Efforts

25X1

1. Attached are three copies of the evaluation of subject report which we have prepared in ORR and have sent to the Saigon station for transmittal to MACV. You may wish to give a copy of this evaluation to [redacted] Please note that this evaluation was prepared solely for ORR and consequently limits itself generally to those parts of the MACV report dealing with the logistical support in base areas.

2. Many thanks to you for your help and hospitality during my recent trip.

25X1

Enclosure:

3 copies of subject report

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee  
1 - Ch/E  
1 - St/P-C  
2 - SA/RR  
1 - D/T

ORR/ [redacted] (25 Jan 67) 25X1

OSD REVIEW  
COMPLETED

ARMY, DIA, USAF, NAVY and  
PACOM review(s) completed.

25X1

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Approved For Release 2008/07/31 : CIA-RDP70S00385R000100070001-3

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28 275

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1

CINCPAC  
COMMUNICATION CENTER  
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COPY NR. ....

//OUTGOING MESSAGE FORM//

## ENEMY LOGISTIC INFILTRATION DURING BOMBING STAND-DOWNS (U)

- A. COMUSMACV 38539/251035Z NOV 67 (NOTAL)  
B. DIAISUP-55-67 OF 24 FEB 67 (BOM)  
C. PACOM WID 12-67 OF 24 MAR 67  
D. PACOM INFILTRATION STUDY IN SUPPORT OF INFILTRATION/  
INTERDICTION CONFERENCE OF 24 JUL 67

1. Ref A requests estimate as to number of trucks and WBLC available for movement of supplies toward DMZ during 2-4 day bombing pause as well <sup>AS</sup> estimated total tonnage involved. Ref B, C and D record the history of the 1967 TET activity in detail and form an excellent basis for prognosticating scope of enemy logistical activity during future stand-downs.

2. DIA currently estimates NVN truck inventory at ~~eleven~~ nine to eleven thousand; therefore, availability of motor transport is not a limiting factor. The same holds true for WBLC. NVN possesses an estimated inventory in excess of 30,000 junks and sampans, numerous tugs, trawlers and barges as well as steel-hulled ocean-going craft which are available for its war effort.

**SECRET**

261500W NOV

LCOL CUNNINGHAM, USAF

SSG SMI TH, USA

GINATOR'S TIME]

DRAFTER:

TYPED:

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

200225-

M: CINCPAC

INFO: CINCUSARPAC  
CINCPACFLT  
CINCPACAF

SPECIAL HANDLING INST

ON: COMUSMACV  
DIA

| CLASSIFICATION | DRAFTER | RELEASE |
|----------------|---------|---------|
| SECRET         | J221/je | J2 OAB  |

CLEAR WITH  
J22 R

J20 R

CEDENCE PRIORITY

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

LR 3280

CHNL  
NR

102

TOD 280347Z

DTG 272341Z NOV 67

| IC | EXEC | ASST | 1/LT | C/S | DEP | DEP | PA | IT | PERS | HIT | OPS | LOG | PLN | CBE | PER | COMP | LEGL | PRO | PROT | MED | J2P | EAO | B/S | MC | DPR | MDC | J2C | NSG |
|----|------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|----|----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
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Approved For Release 2008/07/31 : CIA-RDP70S00385R000100070001-3

CINCPAC  
COMMUNICATION CENTER  
**SECRET**

SUPPLEMENTARY OUTGOING  
MESSAGE FORM

3. During the 8-12 Feb 67 stand-down, an estimated 23,000 tons of supplies and equipment were delivered below the 18th parallel. Some 2,200 trucks were seen in route package I and over 1,400 individual craft in coastal waters in the Sea Dragon area. These sightings equate to an average of 545 trucks and 350 watercraft per day, 22 and 28 times higher, respectively, than daily sightings during normal periods of operation.

4. Numbers-wise the overall NVN force structure in the DMZ area is estimated to have been increased by two to four artillery regiments since last TET holiday. In addition, and considering we also have seen almost a five-fold increase in the number of mortar attacks, as well as the introduction of artillery and rockets into the DMZ area of operation during the past year, we can conservatively estimate NVN logistical requirements well have increased by a factor of one-half in the DMZ area alone.

5. Based on the foregoing rationale and considering the scope and number of major engagements that have occurred throughout SVN during the past year, estimate NVN would attempt to move southward at least 25 percent more tonnage than a year ago, with a corresponding increase in logistical traffic involved.

6. Request addressees provide additional info or comments as considered appropriate. GP-1

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33-343

PRIORITY  
ROUTINE

DTG

070104Z Nov 67

FROM: CINCUSARPAC

**"RECVD VIA MAIL"**

TO: DIA DIAAP-4C (ELECT)

INFO: CINCIPAC

COURIER

CINCIPACFLT

COURIER

CINCIPACFLT

COURIER

SECRET NOFORN GPIN-AA 39583

SUBJ: Estimates of Transit Times on Major NVN

LOG's (U)

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS  
Ref 1a is CM-IN-  
149095, Ref 1b is  
CM-IN-162824, Ref  
1c is CM-IN-  
162754Distr: G2 (2 cys)  
(M&R, ID-AA)MFR: Self  
Explanatory

COORD:

\*Wenner  
Chief, AIB

|          |              |
|----------|--------------|
| DATE     | TIME         |
| 06       | 0850V        |
| MONTH    | YEAR         |
| Nov      | 67           |
| PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES |
| 1        | 2            |

## 1. (U) References:

- CINCIPAC msg DTG 062216Z Sep 67
- DIA DIAAP-4C msg DTG 262343Z Sep 67
- CINCIPAC msg DTG 290339Z Sep 67

## 2. (S-NOFORN) In response to referenced messages 1b and 1c

above, the following are estimated average transit times between  
NVN points as indicated for the month of Oct 67:

LAO CAI - HANOI RR/22 HRS

LAO CAI - HANOI HWY/15 HRS

DONG DANG - HANOI RR/20 HRS

DONG DANG - HANOI HWY/11 HRS

**SECRET NOFORN**

CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER - INCOMING

| INC | EXEC | F/LT | C/S | DEP | DEP |    | JT  |  | OPS |  | CLF | COMP | LEA | PIC | PRCT | MID | J2P | EAO | B/S | JRC | CPR | MDC | JOC | MSG |
|-----|------|------|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|--|-----|--|-----|------|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| 100 | 1001 | 1002 | 101 | 102 | 103 | PA | 104 |  |     |  | 105 | 106  | 107 | 108 | 109  | 110 | 111 | 112 | 113 | 114 | 115 | 116 | 117 | 118 |
|     |      |      |     |     |     |    |     |  |     |  |     |      |     |     |      |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
|     |      |      |     |     |     |    |     |  |     |  |     |      |     |     |      |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |

CWO

K

CTNR

TOR

030027Z

OPN

115

DTG

070104Z NOV 67

SECRET  
and/or CONTINUATION SHEET

SECRET

|            |          |                    |                   |         |
|------------|----------|--------------------|-------------------|---------|
| PRECEDENCE |          | RELEASED BY        | DRAFTED BY        | PHONE   |
| ACTION     | PRIORITY | DONALD G. BATHURST | BERNARD P. SLOFER | 86-1716 |
| INFO       | ROUTINE  | LTC, CE 86-2500    | Major, CE         |         |

15761/08

HAIPHONG - HANOI

RR/18 HRS

HAIPHONG - HANOI

HWY/ 7 HRS

HANOI - VINH

RR/ 6 DAYS

HANOI - DMZ

HWY/11 DAYS

3% (U) Same limitations and assumptions apply as stated in CINCPAC transit

ime msg 062216Z Sep 67

GP-3

SECRET NOFORN

PG 2 OF 2

|                                |       |          |              |                         |          |
|--------------------------------|-------|----------|--------------|-------------------------|----------|
| CONTROL NO.                    | FOR/T | PAGE NO. | NO. OF PAGES | MESSAGE IDENTIFICATION  | INITIALS |
|                                |       |          | 2            | GPIN-AA                 | B        |
| REGRADE INSTRUCTIONS           |       |          |              | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION |          |
| NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED |       |          |              | SECRET NOFORN           |          |

FORM 173-1

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3174

RTTSZYUW RUHHABA5340 2590339-SSSS--RUHHHQA.

ZNY SSSSS

R 160257Z SEP 67

FM CINCPACAF

TO RUMSBJ/7AF TSN AB RVN

INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUHHBRA/CINCPACFLT

RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC

RUEFHQA/CSAF

BT

SECRET DIT 26824 SEP 67. FOR DIT.

SUBJ: (U) DETAILED EVALUATION OF RR IN NVN.

REF YOUR 25883, 3 SEP 67 (S).

1. EXTEND ENEMY USAGE, JUNE 67 THRU AUG 67. STUDY RAILTRAFFIC ALONG NW RAIL LINE REVEALED FOLG ROLLING STOCK SIGHTINGS FOR JUNE, JUL AND AUG 67. ALONG WITH THESE FIGURES ARE APPROX TOTALS ROLLING STOCK DAMAGED OR DESTROYED THIS PERIOD AS RESULT OF STRIKES AGAINST LOC TGTS ALONG RAIL LINE. TOTALS COMPLIED BY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS PILOT REPORTS AGAINST PHOTO RECCE MSNS.

JUN 67: 818 SIGHTED 227 DMGD/DEST

JUL 67: 459 SIGHTED 89 DMGD/DEST

AUG 67: 393 SIGHTED 29 DMGD/DEST

DECLINE IN NUMBER ROLLING STOCK SIGHTED THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD PARTIALLY DUE WX AND LACK OF PRESENCE OVER NW RAIL LINE DURING LATTER PORTION OF PERIOD. SIMILAR STUDY MADE COVERING NE RAIL LINE AND RESULTED IN FOLG TOTALS:

JUN 67: 1686 SIGHTED 458 DMGD/DEST

JUL 67: 1913 SIGHTED 257 DMGD/DEST

AUG 67: 1630 SIGHTED 287 DMGD//DEST

OF 1630 PIECES ROLLING STOCK SIGHTED AUG 67, APPROX 520 LOCATED IN CHINA BUFFER ZONE.

2. TONNAGE OF SUPPLIES OVED PER DAY. DUE LACK OF COMPREHENSIVE PHOTO COVERAGE RAIL LINES IN NVN NOT POSSIBLE

TO GIVE ACCURATE ACCOUNT TO TONNAGE BEING MOVED OVER LOC'S PER DAY. PACAF COMMANDO WASP REPORTS 2 AND 3, NOW BEING PUBLISHED

**SECRET****CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER - INCOMING**

200225

| CINC<br>J00 | EXEC<br>ASST<br>J001 | F/LT<br>J002 | C/S<br>J01 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J02 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J03 | PA | IT<br>SEC<br>J04 | PERS<br>J1 | INT<br>J2 | OPS<br>J3 | LOG<br>J4 | PLN<br>J5 | C&E<br>J6 | PER<br>J71 | COMP<br>J72 | LEGL<br>J73 | PIO<br>J74 | PROT<br>J75 | MED<br>J76 | J2P | EA0 | B/S     | JRC | OPR    | WDC | J02C | NSG |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|----|------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----|-----|---------|-----|--------|-----|------|-----|
| X           | X                    |              | X          | X                 | X                 |    |                  |            | C         | X         |           | X         |           |            |             |             |            |             |            | X   | X   |         |     | X      |     |      |     |
| CWO         |                      |              |            |                   |                   |    |                  | CTNR       |           | 3174/16   |           | TOR       |           | 160610Z    |             | OPR         |            | 56          |            | DTG |     | 160257Z |     | SEP 67 |     |      |     |

PAGE 1 OF 2

3174/16

INCLUDE DETAILED INFO THIS SUBJ. 7AF WILL RECEIVE COPY ASAP UPON COMPLETION.

3. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE EACH RAIL LINE TO OVERALL NVN LOC/SUPPLY SYSTEM. NW RAIL LINE IS PRINCIPLE LOC BETWEEN MENG TZU, CHINA AND HANOI, AND IS PRIMARY LOC FOR MOVING SUPPLIES FROM MENG TZU TO HANOI. SINCE DESTRUCTION VIET TRI RR/HWY BR, 616-00037, JUNE 66, RAIL TRAFFIC SHUTTLED ACROSS RIVIERE CLAIRE BY RAIL FERRIES CAUSING MINOR DELAY IS DISTRIBUTION OF SUPPLIES THRU-OUT HANOI AREA. NE RAIL LINE IS PRIMARY LOC FOR MOVING SUPPLIES FROM PING-HSIANG, CHINA TO HANOI. IF RAIL TRAFFIC ALONG THIS LINE HALTED, SUPPLIES COULD BE OFF-LOADED NUMEROUS POINTS AND SHIPPED BY TRUCK ALONG RTE 1A WHICH RUNS PARALLEL TO NR RAIL LINE INTO HANOI. DESTRUCTION JCS 12, JCS -13 AND JCS 13 BYPASS BRIDGE IN AUG 67 FORCED ENEMY TO USE FERRY CROSSINGS THESE POINTS, GREATLY DECREASING VOLUME OF THRU TRAFFIC.

4. EFFORT/CAPABILITY OF ENEMY TO REPAIR DAMAGE. TREND IN RAIL REPAIR TO KEEP RAIL LINES OPEN TO THRU TRAFFIC AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE. RAIL YDS NOT BEING REBUILT TO ORIGINAL CAPACITY. INSTEAD, OPENED TO THRU TRAFFIC, AND DESTROYED AREAS OF YDS NOT BEING REPAIRED. BY DOING THIS, RAIL LINES CAN BE KEPT SERVICEABLE TO THRU TRAFFIC WHILE MAJOR REPAIRS BEING MADE IN YDS. RAIL CUTS AND DMGD TRACK IN RAIL YD CAN BE REPAIRED WITHIN 12-24 HRS. TREND IN RR BRIDGES IS TO BUILD WITH REMOVABLE SPANS. AL BYPASS BRIDGES ON NE RAIL LINE CONSTRUCTED THIS MANNER. CONTINUOUS STUDY AVAILABLE PHOTOGRAPHY INDICATES THESE BRIDGES SELDOM FULLY ASSEMBLED WHILE MAIN BRIDGES SERVICEABLE. IN ONE CASE, DAP CAU RR BYPASS BR W, 616-02440, KEPT SERVICEABLE WHILE MAIN BRIDGE, 616-00023, DISMANTLED THIS DONE BECAUSE BYPASS BRIDGE REPAIRED IN LESS TIME THAN MAIN BRIDGE. DUE LACK OF REPETITIVE PHOTOGRAPHY, FOLG STRIKES AGAINST RAIL LINES, NOT POSSIBLE TO GIVE ACCURATE REPAIRABILITY FACTOR FOR RAIL BRIDGES WITHOUT BYPASSES. #923134, PAST ANALYSIS INDICATED BRIDGES REPAIRED WITHIN 5-10 DAYS AFTER SPANS DROPPED OR HEAVILY DMGD. FURTHER ANALYSIS REVEALS DEST OR DMGD THRU-TRUSS SPANS NOW BEING REPLACED BY DECK TYPE SPANS. THIS CHANGE FACILITATES EVEN MORE RAPID SERVICEABILITY FOR DMGD/DEST BRIDGES. GP-3

BT

NNNN#

**SECRET**

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07 349

82

1919

RTTSZYUW RUHHBRA3049 249222Z-SSSS--RUHHHQA.

ZNY SSSSS

R 062222Z SEP 67

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

INFO RUHHABA/CINCPACAF

RUHHRGA/CINCUSARPAC

BT

S E C R E T

A. CINCPAC 020507Z SEP 67

FM CINCUSARPAC 302254Z AUG 67

C. CINCPACFLT 290454Z AUG 67 (NOTAL)

D. DIA 241632Z AUG 67 —S

1. REF A REQUESTS COMMENTS ON RAIL STATUS TERMINOLOGY PROPOSED IN REF B. BY REF C, CINCPACFLT RECOMMENDED ADOPTION OF DIA TERMINOLOGY CONTAINED IN REF D.

2. BASICALLY, THE TERMINOLOGY SUGGESTED IN PARA 2 OF REF B IS USED BY CINCPACFLT IN THE BIWEEKLY RT BRIEFING TO DESCRIBE THE STATUS OF RAIL LINES WITHIN NAVY PACKAGE AREAS. THIS INFORMATION IS SUMMARIZED AND AN OVERALL OPEN CLOSED STATUS IS ASSIGNED EACH RAIL LINE. THE TERM @INTERDICTED@ PROPOSED IN REF B COULD BE SUBSTITUTED FOR @CLOSED@ WITHOUT LOSS OF MEANING. THE DIA TERM @SHUTTLE,@ USED TO DEFINE THOSE LINES ON WHICH THROUGH TRAFFIC MUST USE A FERRY TO BYPASS AN INTERDICTION, WOULD ADD A MEANINGFUL AND NECESSARY THIRD CATEGORY. THE TERM @PROBABLY CLOSED@ HAS BEEN USED BY CINCPACFLT TO DESCRIBE THOSE LINES WHICH ALL EVIDENCE INDICATES HAVE BEEN INTERDICTED, BUT FOR WHICH SUBSTANTIATING GOOD QUALITY PHOTOGRAPHY IS LACKING.

3. RECOMMEND STANDARDIZED TERMS OPEN, SHUTTLE, INTERDICTED, AND PROBABLY INTERDICTED BE ADOPTED FOR USE BY PACOM IN REPORTING THE STATUS OF NVN RAIL LINES.

GP-4

BT

**SECRET**

CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER - INCOMING

210145

| CINC<br>J00 | EXEC<br>ASST<br>J001 | F/LT<br>J002 | C/S<br>J01 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J02 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J03 | PA      | JT<br>SEC<br>J04 | PERS<br>J1 | INT<br>J2 | OPS<br>J3 | LOG<br>J4 | PLN<br>J5 | C&E<br>J6 | PEG<br>J71 | COMP<br>J72 | LEGL<br>J73 | PIO<br>J74 | PROT<br>J75    | MED<br>J76 | I2P | EA0 | B/S | JRC | DPR | MDC | J02C | NSG |  |  |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------|------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|----------------|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|--|--|
| X           | X                    |              | X          | X                 | X                 | X       |                  |            |           | A         | X         | X         | X         | X          |             |             |            |                |            |     | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   |      | X   |  |  |
| CWO         |                      |              |            | CTNR              |                   | 1919/07 |                  | TOR        |           | 070217Z   |           | OPR       |           | 117        |             | DTG         |            | 062222Z SEP 67 |            |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |  |  |

07 333

33

1974

RTTSZYUW RUHHMOD0416 1500000-SSSS--RUHHHQA.

ZNY SSSSS

DE RUEPJS 098C 2492114

ZNY SSSSS

R 061950Z SEP 67 ZFF-3

FM DIA

TO RUHHABA/PACAF

INFO RUHHHQA/CINCPAC

RUMSBJ/7 AF

182341Z AUG 67.

FM DIA

TO PACAF

INFO CINCPAC

7 AF

BT

SECRET DIAAP-4 4336 AUG. 67.

REFERENCE CINCPACAF MSG R112326Z AUG. 67 DIT 27868 (NMCC 17364). 1. THE 60 PERCENT FACTOR APPLIED TO FREIGHT CARS DESTROYED WAS INITIATED AFTER ANALYSIS OF PILOT REPORTING. REPORTED PROBABLE DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION IS BEING CONSIDERED. RECENT COMPREHENSIVE PHOTOGRAPHY OF EQUIPMENT OPERATING IN THE COUNTRY INDICATES THAT THE 60 PERCENT FACTOR IS ACTUALLY OVER-OPTIMISTIC AND RE-EVALUATION OF THIS FACTOR MAY BE NECESSARY. 2. PHOTO

COVERAGE IS NOT ADEQUATE TO COMPREHENSIVELY COUNT RAIL EQUIPMENT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED. MULTIPLE RESTRIKES FURTHER COMPOUND THE PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING OLD AND NEW DAMAGE. OP REP-4 MESSAGES ARE THE PRIMARY SOURCES OF DATA FOR ESTIMATING DESTROYED/DAMAGED EQUIPMENT AND, WHEN POSSIBLE, CONFIRMED BY PHOTOGRAPHY. 3. WOULD APPRECIATE ANY VIEWS WHICH WOULD HELP FIRM UP THESE FIGURES.

GP-3

BT

SECRET

CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER - INCOMING

2/1013

| CINC<br>J00   | EXEC<br>ASST<br>J001 | F/LT<br>J002 | C/S<br>J01 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J02 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J03 | PA | SEC<br>J04 | PERS<br>J05 | INT<br>J06 | OPS<br>J07 | LOG<br>J08 | PLN<br>J09 | C&E<br>J10 | PEG<br>J11 | COMP<br>J12 | LEGL<br>J13 | PIO<br>J14 | PROT<br>J15 | MED<br>J16 | J2P | EAD | B/S | JRC | DPR | MDC | J02C | NSG |
|---|----------------------|--------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|----|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
| X   | X                    |              | X          | X                 | X                 |    |            |             |            | X          |            |            |            |            |             |             |            |             |            | X   |     |     |     | X   |     |      |     |
| CWO   |                      |              |            |                   |                   |    |            |             |            |            |            |            |            |            |             |             |            |             |            |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |
| CTNR 1974/07 TOR 070347Z OPR 117 DTG 182341Z AUG 67 |                      |              |            |                   |                   |    |            |             |            |            |            |            |            |            |             |             |            |             |            |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |

TICKLER 061950Z SEP 67

07 375

42

RYBAT

TOVV HPA720//////// ~~SECRET~~ S E C R E T MSG FOLLOWS////////////////////////////////**PRIORITY**

VVZCZCHPB027

PP RUHKA

DE RUHKB 2951 2490401

ZNY TTTTT

P 060401Z SEP 67

FM CINCPACFLT

TO RUHKA/CINCPAC

RUHLKM/CINCPACAF

RUHHRGA/CINCARPAC

ZENXCOMSEVENTHFLT

RUMSAL/COMSEVENTHAF

ZEN/CTF SEVEN SEVEN

BT

T O P S E C R E T SECTION ONE OF TWO  
ROLLING THUNDER INTERDICTION PLAN (U)

A. CINCPAC 302011Z JUL 67 (BOM) NOTAL

B. CINCPACFLT 022152Z AUG 67 NOTAL

C. UEYT 737 B/2, PAN 17, 21 AUG 67

D. CINCPACFLT 250247Z AUG 67

1. REF A REQUESTED AN APPRAISAL OF THE EXTENT THAT THE  
RT 57 ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO INTERDICT LOC'S WITHIN THE  
RESTRICTED AREAS WOULD ASSIST IN CARRYING OUT RT OBJEC-  
TIVES. REF B PROVIDED AN INITIAL APPRAISAL OF INTERDICTION  
AND PREDICTED THAT AS INTERDICTION EFFORTS INCREASED IN~~SECRET~~**SECRET**

CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER - INCOMING

310145

| CINC<br>J00 | EXEC<br>ASST<br>J001 | F/LY<br>J002 | C/S<br>J01 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J02 | DEP<br>C/S<br>J03 | PA | JT<br>SEC<br>J04 | PERS<br>J1 | INT<br>J2 | OPS<br>J3 | LOG<br>J4 | PLN<br>J5 | C&E<br>J6 | PEG<br>J71 | COMP<br>J72 | LEGL<br>J73 | PIO<br>J74 | PROT<br>J75 | MED<br>J76 | 12P | EA0 | B/S | IRC | OPR            | MDC | J02C | MSG |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------|------------|-------------------|-------------------|----|------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|----------------|-----|------|-----|
| X           | X                    |              | X          | X                 | X                 |    |                  |            | X         | A         |           | X         | X         |            |             |             |            |             |            | X   | X   | X   |     | X              |     |      |     |
| CWO         |                      |              |            |                   |                   |    |                  | CTNR       |           | 4720/06   |           | TOR       |           | 061859Z    |             | OPR         |            | 45          |            | DTG |     |     |     | 060401Z SEP 67 |     |      |     |

4720/06

RP VI. THE ENEMY WOULD BE FORCED TO MOVE HIS LUCRATIVE ROLLING STOCK INSIDE THE 10 AND 4 NM SANCTUARIES. ANALYSIS OF REF C PHOTOGRAPHY INDICATES 91 PIECES OF ROLLING STOCK TRAPPED AT THE HANOI RR FERRY BY-PASS (616-00413). THIS MAY BE INDICATIVE OF FUTURE LUCRATIVE TGTS WHICH DEVELOP AS A RESULT OF STRIKING KEY TGTS ALONG THE NEWLY AUTHORIZED LOC'S.

2. MANAGEMENT OF LOWER RP INTERDICTION PROGRAMS HAS REQUIRED ON-THE-SPOT EVALUATION OF AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE AND TIMELY STRIKE REACTION TO FLEETING TGTS. IN ORDER TO CONDUCT AN INTERDICTION PROGRAM OF THIS TYPE IN RP VIB, ALL LOC'S AND LOC-ASSOCIATED TARGETS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND A GENERAL PLAN OF STRIKE INTERDICTION AGAINST SELECTED INTERDICTION TGTS IN RP VIB, INCLUDING THE HANOI/HAIPHONG RESTRICTED AREAS, HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. PROVISION WILL BE MADE FOR STRIKES IN THE INTERDICTION SENSE AGAINST FLEETING LUCRATIVE TGTS ALONG AUTHORIZED LOC'S. THIS PLAN IS COMPLIMENTARY TO THE EXISTING DST MK-36 EMPLOYMENT PLAN OF REF D. THE DST MK-36 PLAN AND THIS STRIKE INTERDICTION PLAN ARE DYNAMIC AND VITAL

TO EACH OTHER. THEY BOTH MUST BE PURSUED CONCURRENTLY TO ACHIEVE REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES:

- A. ISOLATE HAIPHONG FROM THE NVN INTERIOR:
- B. ISOLATE THE HANOI/HAIPHONG COMPLEXES FROM EACH OTHER:
- C. ISOLATE THE HANOI/HAIPHONG COMPLEXES FROM THE

SOUTHERN ROUTE PACKAGES OF NVN.

3. THIS PLAN IS BASED ON THE FOLLOWING ASSUMPTIONS:

A. THE WEIGHT OF STRIKE/DST MK-36 SEEDING EFFORT IN THE NE SECTOR WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 2,000 SORTIES PER MONTH FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS WITH A BALANCED EFFORT CONTINUING IN THE SOUTHERN ROUTE PKGS.

B. FIRST PRIORITY IN STRIKE EFFORT WILL BE AGAINST RT 57 (AS RECENTLY AUGMENTED) ALFA TARGETS OR ANY SUBSEQUENT RT AUTHORIZED ALFA TARGETS.

C. DST MK-36 WILL BECOME AVAILABLE IN INCREASING NUMBERS TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE REF C SEEDING PROGRAM WHICH SHOULD BE A CONCURRENT EFFORT AGAINST SELECT NE SECTOR LOCS TO EXTEND THE EFFECTS OF AND CAPITALIZE ON THE STRIKES AGAINST FIXED INTERDICTION TARGETS SET FORTH

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IN THIS PLAN.

D. AECM WILL BE REQUIRED IN RTE PKG VIB AREAS AND 7AF EB66 SUPPORT WILL BE AVAILABLE FOR ONLY ABOUT ONE HOUR IN THE MORNING AND ONE IN THE AFTERNOON (APPROX 0800-0900 AND 1600-1700) UNLESS ADDITIONAL AECM COVERAGE BECOMES AVAILABLE.

E. ENEMY DEFENSES IN THE NE SECTOR WILL REMAIN SUFFICIENTLY PERMISSIVE TO PERMIT THE WEIGHT OF SHRIKE/DST MKAAY SEEDING EFFORT ENVISAGED HEREIN AND ACFT/CREW LOSS RATES EXPERIENCED IN THE NE SECTOR WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY CONSTANT.

4. WITHIN THE ASSUMPTIONS STATED ABOVE, THIS PLAN PROVIDES FOR INTERDICTION AND HARASSMENT OF THE MAIN AND SECONDARY LOC'S BETWEEN HAIPHONG AND HANOI AND THOSE LOC'S LEADING SOUTHWARD FROM BOTH CITIES, UTILIZING PRESENTLY AVAILABLE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. RESULTS ACHIEVED FROM THIS PLAN WILL BE LIMITED IN EFFECTIVENESS WITHOUT COROLLARY AREA DENIAL THROUGH AVAILABILITY OF LARGE NUMBERS OF DST MK-36 WEAPONS AS STIPULATED IN REF D (AND ADDITIONS THERETO). THE DST SEEDING PLAN IS CURRENTLY SUFFERING FROM A PAUCITY OF WEAPONS. UNTIL DST MK-36S BECOME AVAILABLE IN QUANTITY, THE PLAN PRESENTED HEREIN WILL BE EXECUTED, BUT WILL AVOID A DISCERNIBLE PATTERN WHICH THE ENEMY COULD UTILIZE TO HIS DEFENSIVE ADVANTAGE. THE FOLLOWING GENERAL PRIORITIES WILL BE UTILIZED IN THE ASSIGNMENT OF STRIKE EFFORTS:

A. TARGETS ALONG AND ON THE EAST/WEST LOC'S BETWEEN HAIPHONG AND HANOI.

B. TARGETS ALONG AND ON THE NORTH/SOUTH LOC'S BELOW HANOI SOUTH TO THE AREA OF PHU LY (INCLUDING CANAL-DES BAMBOUS).

C. TARGETS ALONG AND ON THE LOC'S RUNNING SOUTHWEST FROM HAIPHONG TO THE AREA OF THAI BINH/NAM DINH AND THOSE LEADING TO THE NORTHEAST AND NORTHWEST FROM HAIPHONG TO THE AREAS OF HON GAI/CAM PHA AND SEPT-PAGODES/BAC NINH.

GENERAL PRIORITIES WILL BE SHIFTED AS CONTINUING RECONNAISSANCE EFFORT TENDS TO REVEAL THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ENEMY IS DIVERTING THE FLOW OF LOGISTIC TRAFFIC. FIXED TARGETS WILL BE ASSIGNED TO STRIKE GROUPS; FLEETING LUCRATIVE TARGETS ENCOUNTERED ALONG AUTHORIZED ROUTES WILL TAKE PRIORITY

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AND APPROPRIATE FORCES WILL BE DIVERTED BY THE STRIKE LEADER. THESE LUCRATIVE TARGETS INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO TRAINS, TRUCK CONVOYS, WBLC/BARGE CONCENTRATIONS, PT BOATS, DREDGES AND DETECTED/OCCUPIED SAM SITES. FIXED TARGETS WILL BE STRUCK IN A PREPLANNED ORDER ALONG EACH ROUTE WITH WEIGHT OF EFFORT GRADUALLY MOVING CLOSER TO HANOI AND HAIPHONG (WITHIN PRESENTLY AUTHORIZED LIMITS). EXECUTION OF THE DST MK-36 SEEDING PLAN WILL CONTINUE CONCURRENTLY AS AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS PERMITS. WHEN NIGHT FLYING IS BEING CONDUCTED OR DURING PERIODS OF BAD WEATHER, A6 ALL-SYSTEMS ATTACKS WILL BE EMPLOYED TO SEED RADAR SIGNIFICANT TARGETS AND HARASS AREAS OF SUSPECTED RECONSTRUCTION. WALLEYE ATTACKS WILL BE PRIMARILY CONFINED TO IMPORTANT TARGETS IN THE NE SECTOR UNTIL WALLEYE WEAPONS BECOME MORE PLENTIFUL.

5. WITHIN THE ABOVE GUIDE LINES AND PRIORITIES, SPECIFIC TARGETS (IN ADDITION TO THE DST MK-36 SEEDING TARGETS) RECOMMENDED FOR ATTACK ARE LISTED BELOW (KEYED TO PRIORITIES IN PARA 4 ABOVE). ATTACKS ON SOME OF THESE TGTS WILL BE DEPENDENT UPON ADEQUATE TARGETING MATERIALS BECOMING AVAILABLE:

A. ALONG AND ON EAST/WEST LOCS BETWEEN HAIPHONG/HANOI:

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T O P S E C R E T SECTION TWO OF TWO

(1) LOCS RR 3/HWY 5/HWY 56/WATERWAY 58 (CUA CAMLX WATERWAY 55 (LACH THAY)).

(A) THANH LIEN RR SIDING, 0616-Q0147.

(B) HAI DUONG RR/HQY BR E. COMPLEXN JCS 18.25, AND

BYPASSES.

(C) HAI DUONG RR/HWY BR COMPLEXN JCS 11, AND BYPASSES.

(D) HAI DUONG HWY PNTN BR/FY, 0616-Q0032.

(E) HAI DUONG BKS WEST, 0616-00669.

(F) HAI DUONG RR SIDING W, 0616-02624.

(G) NGOC KUYET SIDING AND RR BR COMPLEX, 205750N/1061020E.

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- (CHL) KE SAT HQY BR, 0616-01049.
- (I) KE SAT MILITARY STORAGE, 0616-00548.
- (J) VAN NHUE POSS MIL HQ, 0616-Q0238.
- (K) BAN YEN NHAN ARMY BKS, 0616-00367.
- (L) LAC DAO RR SIDING, 0616-02449.
- (ML) AN THAI RR SIDING, 0616-02909.
- (N) CO PHUC BARGE YARD 616-03503.
- (O) AN PHU TRANS PT, 616-03409.
- (P) AN PHU RR SIDING, 616-02433.
- (Q) VAT CACH THUONG RR BR, 0616-01772.
- (R) DO NHA HWY BR, 616-02208.
- (S) VAT CACH THUONG RR SIDING, 616-03614.
- (T) AN NINH NOI SHIPYARD (XJ630210) 616-03358.
- (U) KIEU BAI HQY FY, 616-01067.
- (V) THAI LAI TRANS PT, 616-03396.
- (W) LOI DONG TRANS PT, 616-03237/03315.
- (X) DONG CIOI HQY CSWY W 616-03430
- (Y) DONG CIOI HWY BR, 616-01115.
- (Z) KIEN AN SHIPYARD PHONG CHU, 616-03356.
- (AA) CHI LAI TRANS PT, 616-03410.
- (BB) NHU KIEN AN TRANS PT NO 2, 616-03352.
- (CC) KIEN AN TRANS PT, 616-00711.
- (DD) KIEN AN HWY FY, 616-01910.
- (EE) QUINH KHE RR SPUR, 616-Q0439.

B. ALONG AND ON ROUTES SOUTH OF HANOI.

- (1) RR 4/HWY 1A:
  - (A) PHU LY AREA COMPLEXM
  - (B) NINH LAO RR SIDING, 0616-02185.
  - (C) CO TRAI RR/HQY BR, JCS 18.22 (616-00664).
  - (D) MY LAM RR SIDING, 0616-02910.
  - (E) DO XA RR STA AND YD, 0616-Q0411.
  - (F) YEN DUYEN RR SIDING, 0616-02504.
  - (G) PHU COC RR SIDING, 0616-02462.
- (2) ROUTE 21:
  - (A) CHO BEN HWY BR OV STRM, 0616-00819.
  - (B) CHO BEN HWY BRS, 0616-01032.
  - (C) JUNCTION HWY 21 AND 212, 204840N/1053910E.
- (3) ROUTE 65/WATERWAY 23 (SONG DAYLC
  - (A) PHU LY TRUCK PK, 0616-Q0406.

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(B) HWY 65 FY CROSS OV SONG DAY, 203500N/1055030E.  
(C) HQY 65 AND SONG DAY CHOKE POINT, 204320N/1054630E.  
(D) INTERSECTION HWY 65 AND HWY 212, 204820N/1054650E.  
(4) ROUTE 11A/WATERWAY 27 (RED RIVER)/WATERWAY 30 (CANAL  
DES BAMBOUS):

(A) LA TIEN FY OV CANAL DES BAMBOUS, 204000N/1061405E.  
(B) HAI YEN HWY FY OV SONG LUOC, 0616-01065.  
(C) DONG YEN BOAT REP FAC, 0616-Q0320.  
(D) DONG LO TRANS PTS, 0616-02399/02400.  
(E) BANG NHA HQY BR., 0616-M1712.

C. ALONG AND ON LOCS SOUTHWEST AND NORTHEAST FROM  
HAIPHONG:

(1) HWY 10/HWY 53:

(A) CO DUNG HWY FY, 0616-01059  
(B) DONG LINH HWY BR/FYN PYQYAP0357  
(C) NINH GIANG HWY FY, 0616-01073  
(D) NOI THANG FY OV CANAL, 0616-01074  
(E) LANG LIEN FYS, 0616-01069/Q0256  
(F) HOANG XA HWY BR/CSWYN YQYAPQ0P0  
(G) AN LUAN TRANS PT, 616-03408

(H) AN LUAN SUPPLY DPO, 616-00250

(I) DU DONG FY OV SONG VAN LUC, 616-01061

(2) HWY 10 (NW OUTSIDE RESTRICTED AREA)/HWY 189/HWY 18:

(A) CHAP KHE HQY BR, 616-P0245  
(B) HAIPHONG HWY BR, 0616-00331  
(C) VANG DANH RR SIDING/SPUR, 0616-P0303  
(D) BIEU NGHI HQY BR NE OV STRM, 0616-01437  
(E) HAIPHONG HWY BR, 616-00332  
(F) LUONG KE HWY BR, 616-02213  
(G) LUONG KHE CAVE STOR, 616-Q0117

6. ATTACKS ON THE FOREGOING TARGETS IN CONJUNCTION WITH  
CONTINUED PRIORITY ATTENTION TO RT ALFA TARGETS AND DST  
MK-36 SEEDING SHOULD RESULT IN IMPEDING THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES  
IN THE HANOI/HAIPHONG COMPLEXES AND CREATE BOTTLE NECKS  
AT THE HAIPHONG DOCKS AND IN THE CITY ITSELF THEREBY CURTAILING  
MOVEMENT OF SUPPLIES TOWARD THE SOUTH. THIS INTERDICTION  
PLAN AND TARGET LIST IS AN EXTENSION OF THE PACFLT INTER-  
DICTION CAMPAIGN PRESENTLY BEING CONDUCTED IN RPS II, III,  
AND IV. THIS LIST OF TARGETS IS DYNAMIC.  
AS THE ENEMY REACTS TO OUT STRIKES AND DIVERTS

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TRAFFIC TO SECONDARY ROUTES, NEW TARGETS WILL BE ADDED AND UNWORTHY TARGETS DELETED FROM THIS LIST TO CONTINUE A DYNAMIC AND EFFECTIVE INTERDICTION CAMPAIGN.

7. TO THIS END, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT ALL RP VIB INTERDICTION TARGETS CONTAINED IN APPENDICES I, III, AND IV OF ANNEX A TO THE CINCPAC BASIC OP ORDER BE REMOVED AND THAT THE RP VIB INTERDICTION TARGETS AND CAMPAIGN BE MANAGED AS STATED HEREIN BY THE TACTICAL COMMANDERS. IN THIS MANNER THE OVERALL NVN INTERDICTION WEIGHT OF EFFORT CAN BE APPLIED IN THOSE AREAS WHERE ENEMY ACTIVITY IS GREATEST, AND MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERDICTION TARGET LIST CAN MAINTAIN THE DYNAMIC MANNER REQUIRED FOR A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE CAMPAIGN.

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P 310029Z AUG 67

FM CINCPACAF

TO CINCPAC

PRIORITY

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S E C R E T NOFORN DIE 20418 AUG 67.

SUBJECT: (U) NVN INFILTRATION ANALYSIS.

REFERENCES:

A. CINCPAC 192316Z AUG 67.

B. CINCUSARPAC SNF GPIN-IS 29555 DTG 250516Z AUG 67.

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, PACAF HAS NO SIGNIFICANT  
ADDITIONAL POSITIVE INFORMATION AT THIS TIME.

2. REGARDING REF B, IT IS STILL PACAF FEELING THAT NO  
FIRM BASIS EXISTS FOR QUANTIFYING CASUALTIES FROM AIR  
ATTACKS AMONG INFILTRATORS. AS WAS OBSERVED IN THE  
IIC CONVEDRENCE, THE SAMPLE OF POW REPORTS USED IN  
CONNECTION WITH ATTEMPT TO ASSESS AIR CASUALTIES IS  
CONSIDERED TOO RESTRICTED TO ADMIT MEANING FUL STATISTI-  
CAL ANALYSIS. WE DOUBT THAT INTERROGATION OF RUN-OF-  
MILL PRISONERS:DEFECTORS WILL EVER GIVE CONCLUSIVE  
PICTURE. HOWEVER, IMPLEMENTATION OF PACAF SUGGESTIONS  
FOR EXPANDED INTERROGATION LIST MAY IMPROVE INFORMATIONAL  
BASE.

3. BASED ON COMPILATION FROM ALL REPORTS AVAILABLE TO  
PACAF, WE FEEL TOTAL INFILTRATOR ATTRITION AVERAGES OUT  
AT 20 PER CENT OR MORE. GP-3

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CINCPAC COMMUNICATION CENTER - INCOMING

| CINCPAC | EXEC | F/LT | C/S | DEP | DEP | PA | SEC | PERS | INT | OPS | LOG | PLN | C&E | PEG | COMP | LEGL | PIO | PROT | MED | J2P | EAO | B/S | JRC | DPR | EDC | JO2C | HSG |
|---------|------|------|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|
| 100     | 1001 | 1002 | 101 | 102 | 103 |    | 114 | 11   | 12  | 13  | 14  | 15  | 16  | 171 | 172  | 173  | 174 | 175  | 176 |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |
| X       | X    |      | X   | X   | X   |    |     | X    | X   | X   |     | X   |     |     |      |      |     |      |     | X   | X   | X   | X   | X   |     |      |     |
| CWO     |      |      |     |     |     |    |     |      |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |      |     |      |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |      |     |
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